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Abstract 
I 
Abstract 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) makes great flexibility and high efficiency 
for data acquisition in industry and daily life. At the other side, it brings the privacy 
risks and multiple tags collision issue. Current research in RFID system focuses on the 
security and privacy issue which is based on authentication protocols between a tag and 
a Reader. There is a need to design a reasonable protocol which takes care of both 
multi-tag anti-collision and security issue.  
This thesis presents a new protocol which combines both multi-tag anti-collision 
protocol and multi-tag content access control protocol. Firstly, the multi-tag 
anti-collision protocol and security protocol are analyzed and discussed. According to 
the theoretical basis, the new protocol is designed in order to meet the requirements of 
security and privacy for multi-tag in the context of anti-collision, improve the efficiency 
of identify process and the utilization of signal channel. This new protocol which uses 
hash lock is built on ALOHA anti-collision protocol. A priority register is introduced to 
the protocol, which is useful to deal with the multiple communications between Reader 
and tags.  
Simulation of the proposed protocol is designed under the environment of Matlab, 
using the graphic modeling tool GPenSIM. The main parameters of the simulation are 
referenced from ISO/IEC 18000 international standard. The results shows that the new 
protocol performs well at content access control together with the anti-collision, in this 
way multiple tags can be identified in batch.  
At the end of the thesis, one application about subway tickets access control 
system based on the new protocol is proposed.  
 
Keywords：RFID；Anti-collision protocol；Security technology；Content Access control； 
Modeling and simulation   
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Chapter1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
    Automatic Identification technology is a kind of methods about automatically 
identifying objects without human involvement. RFID reader can collect data from tags 
that attached to objects and store the data to the computer as inputs. With the help of 
computer system, highly automated information or data acquisition process can be 
achieved. Automatic Identification technology is developed rapidly and globally in 
recent decades. Using various media as the information carrier forms different 
automatic identification technology types, such as barcodes technology, biometrics 
technology, magnetic stripes technology, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), 
Optical Character Recognition (OCR), and voice recognition, etc.[1] 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology that uses radio waves for 
Automatic Identification that was developed in 1980’s[1][2]. Typically RFID system 
depicted in Figure1 is composed by two parts: RFID Tags that attached to the objects 
and RFID Readers that can read information from tags. A RFID tag includes an 
integrated circuit that contains information about the object and an antenna to receive 
signals from RFID Readers and transmit information to RFID Readers. 
According to different power support methods, RFID tags can be classified into 
two types: active RFID tags and passive RFID tags. Active tags contain batteries while 
passive tags need external power to provoke signal transmission instead. The maximum 
working range of passive tags is 10 meters. Active tags include battery assisted passive 
tags, or called semi passive tags, with the working range from 100 meters to 1000 
meters respectively. Due to the different applications of RFID tags, there are five classes 
of RFID tags: Class0, which is passive tag, has Electronic Article Surveillance function 
but without storage. Class1 is read only RFID tag, which is used for identification. 
Class2 has read and write functions used for data logging. Both Class1 and Class2 tags 
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can be active or passive. Class3 and Class4 are active RFID tags which have both read 
and write functions. The difference is that Class3 is used for environmental sensor while 
Class4 is mainly for Ad hoc network[11]. 
    RFID system has two normal working patterns: RTF(Reader Talks First) and 
TTF(Tag Talks First ). RTF model is that Reader sends command to tags first, tags will 
reply when receive the command. To the opposite, tags will directly send messages to 
Reader in TTF model.  
Reader TagDatabase
Safe link Unsafe link
Backward 
range
Forward Range
 
Figure1-1 RFID System 
Recently RFID tags are used much more popular than traditional barcode. This is 
because RFID systems have many advantages compared with barcode.[37] First, RFID 
Reader does not use line of sight to read RFID tags while the barcodes must scan within 
the line of sight. Second, the valid distance between RFID tags and a Reader is much 
longer than the barcode system. Third, RFID Readers can scan tags in batch. Fourth, 
most of RFID tags use silicon technology, functions such as large memory for storage 
and calculation ability to support different kinds of security and privacy algorithms can 
be added. In addition, barcode cannot change the stored information which is imprinted, 
but the RFID tags with write function can change the stored information. According to 
these advantages, RFID tags are widely used in various areas, such as animal 
identification, social retailing and product tracking and so on. RFID technology helps 
los of companies to manage their productions and transportations to reduce their cost.  
The technical characteristics of RFID bring some privacy problems because most 
RFID tags are readable by commodity RFID Readers. If RFID tags carry information 
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about the items that they are attached to, Readers can get some private information of 
the person who brings these items. With the large amount of RFID tags and Readers will 
be deployed in the near future, RFID privacy arouse more and more people attention. To 
protect the privacy of tag owner, tag access control is required. Access control means 
authorized Readers need to authenticate themselves to tag before getting tag’s content. 
Unauthorized access to the tag’s memory should be avoided. 
When RFID Reader sends command to tags, tags respond simultaneously, the 
signals will interfere with each other. This is typically called a collision and the result of 
the communication is failed. If one Reader communicates with more than one tag, 
anti-collision methods must be employed. Due to the characters of RFID tags, the 
anti-collision has limited resources such as limited computation power and status 
information etc. Collisions might be difficult to detect because of the vary signal 
strengths between tags.  
1.2 Related research  
Multi-tag anti-collision technologies handle the collision in different ways, which 
can be concluded in Figure1-2.[3][4][5] TDMA is the most common technology among 
them. Tags can respond in probabilistic pattern or deterministic pattern. Most of 
probabilistic response algorithms are based on ALOHA. Before tag responds to the 
Reader, it does not check the channel whether busy or free. The efficiency of the 
protocol is influenced due to the rollback scheme. Some improved approaches, slotted 
ALOHA and dynamic frame ALOHA for example, are developed to increase the 
efficiency.[6] Reader can choose a certain tag to establish communication according to 
the tag’s ID, this model is called deterministic. The most typical deterministic pattern is 
Binary Tree based. If the tags’ response is related to the current status, then it is called 
Memorial algorithm such as Splitting Tree algorithm and Bit-Arbitration algorithm[7], 
otherwise the response is called Memoryless which means it is independent of the 
present status. For instance, Query Tree algorithm, Collision Tracking Tree algorithm, 
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and Tree-walking algorithm are classic ones.[8] 
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Figure1-2 Taxonomy of Anti-collision methods in RFID System 
So far, there is no unique standard or regulation for RFID system. There are 
various of RFID standards including International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO), International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), Ubiquitous ID (UID) from 
Japan and Electronic Product Code (EPC)[9] or EPCglobal mainly used in Europe. 
Among all these standards, ISO/IEC 18000[10] and EPC are the most widely used 
standard in RFID applications. In year 2006, the ultrahigh frequency standard which is 
proposed by EPCglobal is accepted as ISO/IEC 18000-6C regulation. RFID technology 
can be used in various frequency channels. These protocols have different multi-tag 
anti-collision algorithms as listed in Table 1-1. 
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Table 1-1 Anti-collision algorithms in ISO protocol 
Protocol Frequency Anti-collision algorithm 
ISO/IEC 18000-2 <135kHz Query Tree 
ISO/IEC 18000-3 13.56MHz Query Tree, Pure ALOHA,  
Flame slotted ALOHA 
ISO/IEC 18000-4 2.45GHz Adaptive Binary Tree 
ISO/IEC 18000-6 860-960MHz Flame slotted ALOHA (type A/C), 
Adaptive Binary Tree (type B) 
ISO/IEC 18000-7 433MHz Flame slotted ALOHA 
    RFID system offers great efficiency but brings cost of both security and privacy. At 
present, there are physical and cryptography patterns to handle with these risks.[12][13] 
Physical scheme import extra components to protect the information privacy, normally 
like kill mechanism, shielding mechanism or interference mechanism, etc. All these 
manners can perform effectively but cost a bit more. Compare with the physical scheme, 
cryptograph methods do not need extra components. There are many cryptograph 
approaches proposed in recent researches[14][15][16], such as Hash-lock protocol, 
Hash-Chain protocol, David’s Digital Library Protocol and Distributed RFID 
Query-Response Protocol and so on. All these protocols which are based on authority 
and authentication mechanism can protect the privacy to a certain extend. Risks, for 
instance physical vulnerabilities attacks, counterfeiting and eavesdropping, may threaten 
the unprotected tags. In order to satisfy more requirements of security and privacy, some 
improved protocol should be developed.  
From the RFID system overview, anti-collision algorithms are widespread as well 
as security protocols. But the discussion about these two kinds of protocols is quite 
separately[17][18][19], i.e. the security issue is mainly discussed under one Reader and one 
tag system. However, security and privacy protocol should be introduced together with 
anti-collision algorithms in multi-tag applications.[20][21] It is significant to design a 
reasonable multi-tag content access control protocol in order to guarantee the privacy, 
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system efficiency and ultimate channel capacity as well.  
1.3 Thesis overview 
This thesis proposed a multi-tag content access control protocol, which combines 
both multi-tag anti-collision protocol and security and privacy protocol, to meet the 
requirements of security and privacy for multi-tag in the context of anti-collision, and to 
improve efficiency of identify process and utilization of signal channel. A priority 
register mechanism is introduced into this proposed protocol, which is useful during the 
frequent communications between Reader and tags. Modeling and simulation of the 
new protocol is designed under the environment of Matlab. The simulation results state 
clearly that this presented protocol performs well at content access control together with 
the anti-collision. In this way, multiple tags can be identified in batch.  
The reminder of this thesis is organized as follow: 
Chapter 1 introduces the background of RFID system, security and multi-tag 
collision issues. 
Chapter 2 contains a brief discussion and analysis about some classic anti-collision 
algorithms and security and privacy protocols, some related research approaches and 
proposed multi-tag access control problems. 
Chapter 3 presents the access control protocol for a multi-tag system. The system 
performance is discussed based on theoretical derivation, and an alternative approach is 
proposed.  
Chapter 4 is the modeling and simulation part. The proposed protocol model is 
designed under the environment of Matlab. 
Chapter 5 is conclusion and outlines future research. It illustrates one open 
application about subway tickets access control system based on the new protocol. 
Chapter 2 Theory 
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Chapter2 Theory 
2.1 Multi-tag anti-collision protocol  
2.1.1 Multi-tag collision issue 
In RFID system, when more than one tag send signal to one Reader simultaneously, 
the signals will be interfered with each other, as Figure 2-1 illustrates. Reader can 
receive signal from Tag1 correctly during period t1. At period t3, Tag2 and Tag3 send 
signals to Reader while collision occurs at period t2. Under this situation, the Reader 
cannot recognize the correct signal either from Tag2 or Tag3, and this is called 
incomplete collision. Period t4 shows the complete collision between Tag2 and Tag3. 
Collisions caused by conflicting communication signals will influence the system 
efficiency and the data transmission rate. Multi-tag system must employ an 
anti-collision algorithm to avoid these collisions. 
t1
Tag1
Reader
Tag3
Tag2
t2
t3 t4
Invalid signal Signal sent by tags
 
Figure2-1 Multi-tag collision in RFID system（Based on ALOHA） 
One Reader can communicate with multiple tags at the same time by using FDMA, 
SDMA, CDMA or TDMA technologies. Frequency Division Multiple Access, or 
FDMA, assigns several frequency bands or channels to multiple tags individually. Space 
Division Multiple Access, or SDMA, creates parallel spatial multiplexing to the 
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communications between Reader and multiple tags. Code Division Multiple Access, or 
CDMA, which is a kind of spread spectrum technology, offers several tags to share a 
bandwidth of different frequencies by using special coding scheme. In this way, 
multiple tags can communicate with one Reader simultaneously over one channel. Time 
Division Multiple Access (TDMA) divides access by time, which means multi-tag share 
one frequency channel by sending signals at different time slots. Two common 
anti-collision methods using TDMA is tag control method which is mainly considered 
as ALOHA method and Reader control method which is Binary Tree based. Due to low 
cost and limited resources of RFID system, TDMA becomes the most common 
multiplexing technology in various applications.  
2.1.2 Anti-collision protocols 
Binary Tree based algorithms[22][23] that using Manchester coding scheme, require 
precise timing synchronization to polling all tags. Meanwhile the collision bits can be 
marked by using coding methods. If a conflict bit is detected, the tags will be divided 
into two parts. For instance, as Figure2-2 illustrates there are five tags: tag010, tag 100, 
tag101, tag 110 and tag 111. The collision occurs at the very first bit. So the tags divided 
into ‘0’ and ‘1’ index. And then, tag010 is selected, but the rest of the tags still conflict 
by ‘1’ index. Repeat the divided step, tag100 will be selected by twice filter and so as 
the rest.  
Binary search algorithm has good rate of identification which can reach 50% 
efficiency without identify error. The weaknesses of this algorithm are long time delay 
and poor security and privacy. From the other side, if a more complicated coding 
scheme is employed, the process of identification will becomes much tougher.  
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Figure2-2 Example of Tree Based Algorithm 
    Pure ALOHA anti-collision algorithm[24] is the simplest method based on TDMA 
which allows tags to send signals after random time t. If more than one tag sends signal 
to Reader when Reader is communicating with another tag, signals will conflict with 
each other and none of the signals will be received correctly. Tags are required to send 
the signal again once the Reader detects the collision.   
Both incomplete and complete collision exist in the pure ALOHA algorithm with 
the maximum throughput rate 18.4%. This anti-collision algorithm is costly and 
normally applied to the tag read only system which has uncertain number of tags. 
Slotted ALOHA[25] which is a Reader-driven scheme allows RFID tags to send 
signals at a certain time slot. As Figure 2-3 shows, time slots t1 and t2 are the correct 
periods that Reader can identify the certain tag, Tag1 and Tag2. t3 is a collision time slot 
while t4 is an idle one. Slotted ALOHA divides time to several slots and tags have to 
send signal at one slot, which means there is no incomplete collision but only complete 
collisions. Thus, the collision rate is half compared to pure ALOHA, and the efficiency, 
or throughput rate, of slotted ALOHA system is as twice as pure ALOHA. This higher 
performance requires the Reader providing a necessary synchronization. 
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Tag1
Reader
Tag3
Tag2
t1 t2 t4t3
Invalid signal Signal sent by tags  
Figure2-3 Example of Slotted ALOHA 
Framed Slotted ALOHA algorithm pack several time slots as one frame, tags must 
select a certain slot from one frame to transmit signal. As Figure 2-4 illustrates, t0 is one 
frame which contains several time slots. All tags have to send their data in t0. Slots t1 
and t2 are no conflict period when Reader can identify Tag1 and Tag4 correctly, while t3 
is a collision slot and t4 is an idle one. The collision tags will send their data at the next 
frame. It is clearly that the possibility of collisions by using framed slotted ALOHA is 
reduced significantly compared with the slotted ALOHA algorithm.   
Tag1
Reader
Tag3
Tag2
t1 t2 t3
Tag4
t4
t0
Invalid signal Signal sent by tags
 
Figure2-4 Example of Framed slotted ALOHA 
    Framed Slotted ALOHA which uses fixed frame size brings a waste when frame 
size is too long while the number of tags is small, or causes more collisions when there 
are huge numbers of tags but short frame size. To deal with this shortcoming, Dynamic 
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Framed Slotted ALOHA[26] is developed by using changeable frame size. As a result, it 
increases the system efficiency significantly.  
According to the theoretical researches[3][27], assume that all the frames have the 
same length; and the data transmitted from tags obeys Poisson distribution. Let ‘S’ be 
the system throughput and ‘G’ be the mean of the transmission amounts, i.e. there will 
be G transmission times in one frame.  
So in the Pure ALOHA algorithm, the average utilization or throughput is:  S = G × e−2G                                (2.1) 
From equation (2.1), it is easy to see that system will be stable only if G ≤ 0.5, and the 
maximum throughput is 18.4 % when G = 0.5. This means only in 18.4% of the whole 
process, Reader can receive correct signals.   
    The throughput of Slotted AOLHA algorithm is:  S = G × e−G                                (2.2) 
From equation (2.2), it shows that system will be stable only if G ≤ 1, and the 
maximum throughput is 36.8%. 
 
Figure 2-5 Throughput curves of Pure ALOHA and Slotted ALOHA  
    Average packet delay rate should be discussed in ALOHA algorithms as well. The 
total time is the sum of transmission time and channel link time, the waiting time is not 
included. Assume that B� is the average rollback delay which is the variation in various 
statistical functions; D� is the average data delay.  
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In Pure ALOHA algorithm:  D� = e−2G + (e−2G − 1)B�                           (2.3) 
While in Slotted ALOHA algorithm: D� = 0.5 + e−G + (e−G − 1)B�                        (2.4) 
From equation (2.3) and (2.4), D� has its minimum value when B� = 0. 
 
Figure 2-6 Average Data Delay curves of Pure ALOHA and Slotted ALOHA 
In [4], [26] and [27] there are some improved slotted ALOHA algorithms which 
can increase the system efficiency, but all these algorithms cannot ensure all the tags can 
be identified correctly. When the number of tags is increasing, the number of 
unrecognized tags increases. Assume that there are N tags, and M slots for collision 
detection, the probability of the number of tags in one slot, q, obeys binomial 
distribution:  Pq = �Nq� � 1M �q �1 − 1M�N−q                          (2.5) 
If there is only one tag sends signal to Reader, there is no collision. The probability 
of only one tag occupying one slot is P1: P1 = N � 1M � �1 − 1M �N−1                            (2.6) 
So, the number of signals received correctly is Nr : Nr = M × P1 = N × �1 − 1M �N−1                     (2.7) 
Thus, system efficiency is: 
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E = ∑  time  of  receive  signalcorrectly  
∑ time  = Nr ×tr Nr ×tr +t×M               (2.8) 
In (2.8) tr  refers to the time of receiving data, while t is the time of detecting the 
collision. 
Combine equation (2.6) and (2.7), and then:  
E = N×�1− 1M  �N−1×� trt×M�1+N×�1− 1M  �N−1×� trt×M�                            (2.9) 
Figure 2-7 illustrates the efficiency of improved slotted ALOHA, when trt =20 or 50, M = 64 or 128. According to this result, if trt  keeps the same, there is an 
intersection point with different M values. When the RFID system has a small number 
of tags (as the Figure 2-7 shows the point of intersection is around 100 tags, i.e. when 
the tag number is less than 100, it can be considered as a small size RFID system.), 
lower M value makes higher efficiency.  
On the contrary, if there are a large number of tags in RFID system (more than 100 
tags in this example), larger M value is needed to get high efficiency. From other side, if 
M keeps the same, the efficiency has no point of intersection with value of various trt  
values. Higher efficiency can be achieved by increasing trt  value. If both M and trt  
increase, the system’s ability to handle large number of tags will increase.  
 
Figure 2-7 Efficiency curves of Improved slotted ALOHA 
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are only suitable for RFID system with low speed and small number of tags due to the 
hardware limitation. Tree-based approaches can be used in RFID system with large 
number of tags, but the exposed information may cause problem of security and privacy. 
According to some recent research works[28-32], this thesis is only consider ALOHA 
based algorithm which performs well in small size RFID systems.  
2.2 RFID security protocol 
2.2.1 Security and privacy issue 
One problem related with RFID system is unauthorized Reader can read the tag 
information from large distance. For example, even ISO 14443 specifies that the 
nominal read range of a contactless smartcard tag is about 10cm, Readers equipped with 
powerful antenna can scan this kind of tags at a range of 50cm[12]. Because the 
communication between the Reader and tag is wireless, it is hard for the tag owner to 
indicate which tag to read. The threat to people privacy grows when the tag information 
is combined with personal information. For example, a standard EPC tag will response 
with its identity to any Reader request. According to EPCglobal Tag Data Standards[38], 
this tag identity may include information about manufacture name, item type and serial 
number. Using this information, Readers can harvest some private information about 
person who brings this tag. For example, from the type of medicine a people brings, 
Reader can deduce the illness type that this person is suffering from. Another example is 
e-passports that using RFID technology. RFID tag in this e-passport carries not only 
some sensitive data such as holder’s name, birthday and nationality but also some kinds 
of biometrics data such as people’s facial image, iris and fingerprint data that used for 
biometric authentication. Leakage of these kinds of information will bring problem not 
only for passport authentication, but also bring potential security problems for other 
biometric systems. 
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2.2.2 Security and privacy approaches  
RFID system is faced with various security and privacy challenges, but this thesis 
focuses on the content access control issue. Clearly, to protect the privacy of tag owner, 
tag contents should be read only by authorized Readers.  
In [12], [30] and [34] etc, some approaches about RFID tag contents access 
controlling are introduced. These RFID privacy protection approaches can be classified 
as: killing and sleeping, agent scheme and on-tag encryption scheme. 
    One kind of killing approach is used in EPC Gen-2 standard[13]. In this scheme, to 
protect the privacy of the consumer, tag that attached to an item will be killed at the 
point of sale. This means after a tag receives a kill command, it will not response to any 
query. This kill command will be sent together with a tag-specific PIN to prevent illegal 
killing of tags. Killing the tag can protect the tag’s content and consumer’s privacy, but 
it will discard all the information of tags. Similar with this killing approach is the 
sleeping approach.  
    For sleeping approach, tag can enter a sleeping state and can be waken when 
needed. To wake a sleeping tag, user also required to transmit a tag specific PIN to the 
tag. How to manage the PINs for different tags may be a problem for the users. 
People can also use some privacy–enforcing devices to support tag content access 
control. These devices can be carried separated by the consumer or be integrated into a 
mobile phone. For example, in [35], to protect the consumer privacy, a watchdog tag is 
used to decode and show the command transmitted by a Reader to help the consumer to 
judge whether this Reader will hurt his privacy. But these devices have more computing 
power and more sophisticated polices that can be used for privacy protection. For 
example, they can jam the communication between the Reader and tag if the tag is 
scanned by a Reader which is not located at a certain place. Challenges related with 
agent scheme include: consumers sometimes need to specify their privacy policies by 
themselves; these agents needs to understand these consumers’ privacy policies. 
On-tag schemes are the methods that Readers and tags can communicate directly 
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and tags will control access to their contents. Because some RFID tags can offer on-chip 
computation, most of on-tag schemes are based on encryption. Thus, on-tag encryption 
schemes are thought to be more secure for tag access control. 
The first hash-lock access control approach was proposed by Weis[14][33] to prevent 
unauthorized Readers from reading tag contents. In this approach as shown in Figure 
2-8, each RFID tag will have a temporary metaID and will work in either a locked or 
unlocked state. To lock a tag, tag owner will first hash a key and this hashed value will 
be stored in the tag’s memory as metaID=H（key）. The tag owner will store key and 
metaID in a back-end database. After receiving this metaID from tag owner, tag will 
turn to locked state. At locked state, tag will response its metaID to all Reader 
interrogation without other functionality. If tag owner wants to unlock a tag, it will 
query the tag to get this tag’s metaID and use this metaID to get key from the back-end 
database. Then the tag owner sends key to tag. Then, tag will hash the received key and 
compare the hashed value with its metaID that stored in his memory. If they match, tag 
will enter unlocked state and offers its full functionality to Reader.  
Reader TagDatabase
Query
metaID
metaID
Key Key
ID
(metaID|Key|ID) (metaID|ID)  
Figure 2-8 Hash-Lock access control scheme 
There are some disadvantages with this hash-lock access control protocol. First, 
tags need to compute a cryptographic hash function. Secondly, this approach has a key 
management issue. In this hash-lock access control protocol, each Reader that wants to 
access tags content is required to communicate with back-end database to get the key 
required by the protocol. Meanwhile, if any user of a tag wants to know the content of a 
tag, this user is also required to have rights to access these databases as well. This leads 
to the problem of key distribution and access. But this thesis is not going to discuss 
about this issue. 
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Randomized Hash-Lock access protocol has a random number generator which is 
based on Hash-Lock function. This protocol is summarized as follow and it is illustrated 
in Figure 2-9. 
(1)  Reader sends a Query to tags.  
(2)  Tag generates a random number R and hashes the (ID, R) pair. Then tag responses 
the hash result M1=H（ID，R）together with the random number R to the Reader. 
(3)  After receives the (R| H(ID,R)), Reader will connect with the back-end database to 
search all legitimate tags in its database. 
(4)  The database responses all the tags’ ID which the Reader has the authority to 
access the content. 
(5)  Reader will hash all IDs with the random number R, in order to find one matched 
tag IDt who has the same hash value as M1. If there is one ID matches, Reader will 
send the IDt to tag. 
(6)  Tag will compare the IDt with its own ID. If the two IDs are the same, then the tag 
would be unlocked. 
Reader TagDatabase
Query
Query
IDs
IDt
(ID)
(R|H(ID,R))
(ID)  
Figure 2-9 Randomized Hash-Lock access control scheme 
Another on-tag access control approach is to use public-key authentication[36]. In 
this approach, each Reader and tag store its own private key and other party’s public 
key.[37] The Figure 2-10 shows the scheme of key generation and distribution.  
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Figure 2-10 Key generation and distribution 
PKG is the Public Key Generator which generates the key pair. First, PKG 
generates a public key and a relative private key. When Reader sends ID to PKG, which 
is process (2), PKG will send the public key to Reader which refers to step (3). Each tag 
uses its ID to authenticate itself by step (4). At step (5), PKG will respond the valid ID a 
private key which is unique to the certain tag together with the public key. 
If a Reader wants to access the content of a tag, it has to authenticate itself to this 
tag first. Reader will send a query to this tag and this tag will response with a random 
data. Reader uses its private key to encrypt this data, and then sends it back to the tag. 
After the tag decrypts the received cipher text and compares to the original data, the tag 
can verify whether this Reader is an authorized one. The shortcoming of public key 
cryptography is it requires the tag to do complex computations. Considering the 
resources of low-cost RFID tags, it maybe not easy to implement a public key 
authentication protocol when the tag offers low cost.  
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2.3 Summary 
This chapter first discussed several multi-tag anti-collision protocols. After 
specified the principle of multi-tag collision issue, different kind of anti-collision 
algorithms are compared and analyzed which is prepared for the anti-collision part of 
proposed protocol.  
As the same to security and privacy protocol, most common access control 
approaches are described and discussed in this chapter in order to propose an improved 
protocol. 
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Chapter 3 Multi-tag Content Access Control Protocol 
3.1 Communication protocol model between Reader and tag 
The communication protocol between Reader and tags can be illustrates as Figure 
3-1. Multi- tag collisions happen at the communication layer, while the authentication 
process mainly takes place at the application layer. Therefore, there is a challenge to 
protect the security and privacy together with the anti-collision methods. In [20] and 
[21], some relative approaches are proposed.   
Authentication protocol
Anti-collision protocol
Reader Tag
Application layer
Communication layer
Physical layer
Application layer
Communication layer
Physical layer
 
Figure 3-1 Communication Model between Reader and Tag  
3.2 Anti-collision proposal  
Design a reasonable anti-collision protocol need to consider the following metrics. 
First, all the tags who is active in the Reader’s valid working extent should be 
recognized correctly. Second is the performance, i.e. identification efficiency, security, 
noise and error tolerance, should satisfy the application requirements. Third, the power 
cost and bandwidth requirements should not be too much. Except to make sure that all 
the tags can be searched by Reader, the key factor is the communication throughput 
between Reader and tags, which influences the system efficiency and power 
consumption directly. Last part of this section will present an anti-collision proposal 
based on dynamic frame ALOHA.  
3.2.1 Complete monitor anti-collision protocol  
In this proposal, we assume RFID tags have the ability to monitor the 
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communication channel, i.e. active tag can detect the conflict when there is more than 
one tag send signal to Reader at the same time. Here is one example to implement the 
monitor function. Suppose the signal ‘0’ is the coding of ‘1100’ while ‘1010’ stands for 
signal ‘1’. If the tag receives signal such as ‘1000’ and other check bits indicate the 
error as well, it can be thought as a collision.  
Reader broadcasts Query to all tags at its working range first. Once a tag receives 
the Query, it will become active and start to monitor the channel. A random time ∆t is 
introduced in this proposal. If the link is occupied at this moment, the tag will keep on 
listening the situation of channel until the link is free during ∆t. The signal will 
transmit to Reader when the tag believes the link is available. This monitor mechanism 
works during the whole transmission procedure. Once conflict is detected, the tag will 
rollback and send the signal again when the channel is free. This algorithm is described 
as Figure 3-2. 
Query
Reader
Tag
Collision DetectionΔt
Tag sends data to Reader
Collision Detection
Reader 
receives data
Y
N
Y
N
 
Figure 3-2 Anti-collision with channel monitor 
This algorithm guarantees that all tags can be identified with the cost of high 
channel throughput without incomplete collision. Tags should listen to the link through 
the whole communication procedure. Thus, the power consume is more than other 
normal ALOHA-based approaches. The advantage of this algorithm is easy to 
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implement and suitable for the dynamic system with uncertain number of tags. As same 
as other anti-collision protocols, the proposed system will be crash or breakdown when 
attacker occupies the channel all the time, therefore the useful signals are interfered and 
the efficiency will decrease because none valid signal can be received correctly. 
3.2.2 Incomplete Monitor Anti-Collision Protocol 
In ALOHA based protocol, there are some tags which can be thought as hide nodes 
whose signal is stronger than the signal of tag who is transmitting data. This hide nodes 
problem is illustrated in Figure 3-3. Within the Reader’s working range, Reader can 
communication with tag A, B, C, D and E. Tag F is not included in this Reader’s 
working group, and for the simplest assumption that tag F can be considered as working 
at a different frequency, i.e. it won’t interfere the present RFID system. 
Working range of Reader
Working range of tag BWorking range of tag A
Reader
TagE
TagB
TagD
TagA
TagC
r
TagF
 
Figure 3-3 Example of hide node problem 
Considering about tag A, within its working range, it can detect whether tag C is 
transmitting signals to Reader. Tag D can be heard by tag B when tag D is 
communicating with the Reader. But if tag A and tag B send data to the Reader at the 
same time t, both tag A and B cannot detect each other due to so weak signal which 
might be considered as noise. And then, the Reader will receive conflicted data and the 
monitor scheme is invalid as well. Thus, the detecting range of tag should choose 
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reasonable. There is a similar situation that occurs to multi-Reader system, but this 
thesis will not focus on that issue. 
When considering cost and efficiency of monitor mechanism, a new protocol is 
proposed in this section. One incomplete monitor approach is proposed that is tag only 
listens to the channel before send the signal. The idea of this approach is that tag will 
not keep listening during all communication procedure. Figure 3-4 is the incomplete 
monitor protocol. 
Query
Reader
Tag
Collision DetectionΔt
Tag sends data to Reader 
Tag receives ACK?
Y
N
Y
N
waiting
（2Δd+Δε）
Done  
Figure 3-4 Incomplete Monitor Anti-Collision Protocol 
Tag will be active when receives the Query from Reader. It starts to listen to the 
channel, check whether the link is available. This step is the same as complete monitor 
protocol, after keep listening the idle link for a random time ∆t, the tag will send data to 
Reader. And tag will send signal again after each (2∆d + ∆ε) time period, where ∆d 
refers to the maximum data delay according to the Reader’s working range. After the 
Reader receives the correct signal, one ACK message will be sent to the corresponding 
tag from reader. Once the tag receives the ACK, it will stop to send signal every (2∆d + ∆ε) time period which is not periodicity repeating. 
By using ACK mechanism to response the communication, the requirement of 
keep detecting system throughout is not necessary any more. Although the reliability of 
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identification will increase, the load of system link becomes much heavier. This 
protocol will lose its advantage if the system has a large number of tags in or the tag 
data size is big size, because this will result in effective data reduction and system 
performance degradation. 
3.2.3 Theoretical derivation and analysis   
Assume that there are N tags in the system. Regardless of the data rollback delay, 
the probability of q tags sending signals in random time ∆t obeys binomial distribution:    Pq = �Nq� �1N�q �1 − 1N�N−q                           (3.1) 
If there is only one tag sends signal to Reader, there is no collision, and the 
probability of only one tag sending data in ∆t is P1: P1 = �1 − 1N�N−1                               (3.2) 
So, the number of receive correct signals is Nr : Nr = N × P1 = N × �1 − 1N�N−1                      (3.3) 
Thus, system efficiency is: E = ∑  time  of  receive  signalcorrectly  
∑ time  = Nr ×tr Nr ×tr +∆t×N            (3.4) 
In equation (3.4) tr  refers to the time of receiving data, while ∆t is the time of 
detecting the collision. 
Combine equation (3.2) and (3.3), then :  
E = N×�1−1N�N−1×� tr∆t×N�1+N×�1−1N�N−1×� tr∆t×N� = �1−1N�N−1×�tr∆t�1+�1−1N�N−1×�tr∆t�              (3.5) 
Let u = tr
∆t， w = �1 − 1N�N−1 × �tr∆t� = �1 − 1N�N−1 × u                (3.6) 
thus, the system efficiency is: E = w1+w                                  (3.7) 
When the system has large size of N, i.e. there are a larger number of tags, the system 
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efficiency is depends on u. 
 
Figure 3-5 Efficiency curves of monitor protocol 
From Figure 3-5, it is obvious that the system has a larger efficiency when larger 
value of u = tr
∆t is employed. 
3.3 Security proposal using Hash-Lock  
According to the research and analysis in Chapter2, this section introduces a 
Hash-Lock based content access control method as a part of the protocol which will be 
given in the next section.  
    Current Hash-Lock based approaches cannot handle the security or privacy issue in 
parallel. That means the Reader cannot gain the content access permits from multiple 
tags at the same time. In order to implement the multi-tag content access control, this 
new method introduces a priority register which is used to assign the priority of multiple 
tags  
The structure of the register is designed as Figure 3-6. Assuming the length of the 
priority is 16bits. The 10 low bits are assigned to represent the priority of tags, while the 
rest 6 high bits are set to ‘0’ as reservation. If the length of priority is 8bits, then the 
system can arrange 28=256 tags at most, however 210=1024 tags can satisfy most of the 
RFID applications’ requirements right now.  
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Table 3-1 The structure of the priority register 
MetaID R(Priority) 
Fixed length(e.g. 160bits) 16bits(10bits for priority) 
    The initial value of the priority register R is zero. Once a tag enters the queue, the 
register assigns the current value of R to the tag, and the value of R will add one. The 
register will empty the R values when there is a clear command. 
metaID|R
Reader TagDatabase
Query
(metaID|Key|ID|R) (metaID|ID|R)
metaID|R
R|Key
R|Key
R|ID|Content
metaID
R
 
Figure 3-7 Hash-Lock based protocol 
Figure 3-7 is the protocol for multi-tag communication with one Reader based on 
Hash-Lock. Reader will broadcast the Query to tags at first. When the tag receives the 
Query, it will respond its metaID which is stored in memory already. Reader will put the 
metaID into the priority register as soon as received, and assigns the priority value R. 
Then the data (metaID|R) is sent to both tag and back-end database. The database looks 
for the Hash table with metaID and picks up the matched key. By using the R value as 
index, database will return (R|key) to Reader. And (R|key) will be sent to tag. When tag 
gets the key, it will hash the key, and compares the new metaID=H(key) with the one in 
memory. If the two values are same, the Reader is considered to be an authorized one, 
and the privacy communication can continue. Otherwise, the Reader cannot access more 
protected information about the tag.   
As mentioned above, the priority value R plays a role as tag’s second ID. It brings 
a lot of convenience. It is a fast path for frequent communication between tag and 
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Reader, and supports an optimized approach for multi-tag access control with 
anti-collision which will be discussed in section 3.4. 
3.4 Multi-tag content access control protocol using Hash-Lock 
3.4.1 Procedure of proposed protocol   
This section presents a multi-tag content access control protocol using proposed 
anti-collision algorithm in section 3.2.1 and Hash-Lock based method in section 3.3. By 
combining communication layer and application layer, this proposed protocol is 
designed to meet the privacy requirements in anti-collision algorithm and the efficiency 
demands in multi-tag authentication procedure. The detail of the protocol is illustrated 
in Figure 3-8.   
Reader TagsDatabase
Query
metaID
metaID|R
R|Key
R|Key
R|ID|Content
metaID|R
R
 
Figure 3-8 Multi-tag content access control protocol using Hash-Lock 
    The input and output of Reader should be serial. The link of Reader and back-end 
database is considered as reliable. The communication between Reader and tags is 
based on the monitor mechanism which requires the tag has ability to detect the 
collision.    
It is worth noting that stack storage mechanism is introduced as well. When the 
Reader responds to the tags, it will put the data into a stack first, which obeys the first in 
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first out principle (FIFO). This is the basic method in order to implement the Reader 
channel control function.  
One regulation from ISO/IEC 18000 standard[10] says that the tag should respond 
the Reader in 32μs  once receives the request. Due to the complexity of many 
encryption algorithms, the length of the key and the compute ability of the tag, one 
simple conclusion is shown in Table 3-2.[16][37][39][40] Thus, there is a need to modify the 
protocol in order to avoid the invalid operation from tags. 
Table 3-2 Timing of on-tag cryptographic algorithms  
Approach Timing (clk cycles) Time (with 100kHz clock frequency) 
Hash 85-1274 850μs-12.74ms 
AES  1016 10.16ms 
Public key 401-1088 4.01ms-10.88ms 
One approach to deal with the timing issue is to add one control switch. When tag 
receives the Reader’s command, the switch turns on which makes the tag becomes 
active to send data. After the communication finishes, the switch turns off and tag stops 
sending data and enters the Lock status of Hash-Lock. Tag will turn to work status again 
only if the Reader sends request later.  
The flow diagram of the proposed protocol is described in Figure 3-9. 
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Figure 3-9 Flow diagram of proposed protocol  
Note that, in the figure there are two “Reader”s which are exactly the same one. 
And all the “Collision Detection” functions refer to the same mechanism in tags, and 
independent to each other.  
The procedure of the protocol is as followed:   
(1)  Reader broadcasts the Query to tags. 
(2)  Tag turns to be active when receives the Query. Then tag gets its metaID ready and 
starts collision detect function. If the channel is available during a random time 
period ∆t, tag sends metaID to Reader. Meanwhile, the collision detection protocol 
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works through transmission. Once confliction is detected, rollback and repeat this 
step.  
(3)  Reader puts the received metaID into Register, and assigns the priority value R to 
tag. R value adds one. 
(4)  Reader sends (metaID|R) to tag and back-end database. 
(5)  Database looks up Hash table to find the matched key for the metaID and then 
replies (R|key) to Reader. 
(6)  Reader transfers (R|key) to tag, records the time t. 
(7)  Tag hashes the Key, when receives (R|key) from Reader and then compares the 
hash value with the old metaID, and buffers the result. 
(8)  Reader sends (R|GetRseult) to tag 15ms after t. 
(9)  Tag checks the buffer when receives (R|GetRseult), if the authentication is verified, 
then responses to the Reader with ID or Content using collision detection. Otherwise, 
tag keeps Quiet.  
There is a channel control method employed in the Reader sending system. Due to 
the one tag-one Reader RFID model without channel compete, there is no requirement 
to use this method. As to multi-tag application, using this channel control can manage 
the sending data sequence, and therefore guarantee the system accuracy and integrality. 
3.4.2 Analysis of proposed protocol   
    First of all, all the assumptions of the parameter refer to the ISO/IEC 18000 
standard, which ensure the reliability of the protocol. 
Considering the principle mentioned above that tag should respond in 32μs, the 
step (8) is designed which supports 15ms waiting before sends the <GetResult> 
requirement. 
Secondly, security and privacy. The anti-collision algorithm combines the 
Hash-Lock security technology which is using metaID as index instead of original ID. 
The length of Hash value, metaID, is fixed no matter the input length. Hash function has 
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strict mapping relationship which is good enough to protect the privacy of tag’s 
information.  
Thirdly, integrality. In terms of theory, all the tags can be identified by Reader 
within its working range. Since the use of detection function, all signals will be received 
by Reader eventually. If collision is detected, tag will repeat to send the data when the 
channel is available. And the use of random detection time ∆t decreases the collision 
rate and increases the efficiency. 
The efficiency of the system is improved significantly by using the priority 
identification R as well. R changes the communication model in one Reader and 
multi-tag system. And it works efficiently for the frequent communication application.  
From the other side, this protocol has its disadvantages. The expense of the 
increased efficiency and the integrality is high power consumption and the cost of tags. 
And other security method should be used when there is more security request. 
Although this proposal has some limitations, from the economic and efficiency aspects, 
it is reasonable and suitable.   
3.5 Expanded protocol 
As mentioned before, there are some challenges of collision detection. And this 
section presents another approach which based on the incomplete collision detection 
method which discussed in section 3.2.2. 
The procedure of the protocol is as followed:   
(1)  Reader broadcasts the Query to tags. 
(2)  Tag becomes active when receives the Query. Then tag gets its metaID ready and 
starts collision detect function. If the channel is available during a random time 
period ∆t, tag sends metaID to Reader. And tag will repeat it every period (2∆d + ∆ε) until it receives the ACK, i.e. (metaID|R), from Reader. 
(3)  Once Reader receives metaID, it will check about the priority register to make sure 
whether the metaID is already there. If the metaID exists, Reader will not do any 
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operations. Otherwise, Reader puts the received metaID into register, and assigns 
the priority value R to tag. R value adds one. 
(4)  Reader sends (metaID|R) to tag and back-end database. 
(5)  Database looks up Hash table to find the matched key for this the metaID. Then 
replies (R|key) to Reader. 
(6)  Reader transfers (R|key) to tag and recordsthe time t. 
(7)  Tag hashes the Key when it receives (R|key) from Reader. Then tag compares the 
hash value with the old metaID, and buffers the result. 
(8)  Reader sends (R|GetRseult) to tag 15ms after t. 
(9)  Tag checks the buffer when it receives (R|GetRseult). If the authentication is 
verified, tag responses to the Reader with ID or Content similar to step (2). 
Otherwise, tag keeps Quiet.  
3.6 Summary 
This chapter proposes a multi-tag content access control protocol based on the 
theory of chapter 2. Firstly, two main modules are designed and discussed separately. 
One is proposed multi-tag anti-collision algorithm; the other is the protocol of security 
and privacy protection for multiple tags using Hash-Lock. Then, new protocol is 
presented with details and performance analysis. Finally, one expanded protocol is 
designed. 
 
 
Chapter 4 Modeling and Simulation 
33 
Chapter 4 Modeling and Simulation 
4.1 Modeling with GPenSIM 
The modeling part is using GPenSIM[41], which is a tool based on Matlab. There 
are many Petri Net modeling tools, and most of them are flexible to handle with 
complex system. GPenSIM is non-graphic manner using a code programming with 
Matlab platform which is a much simpler but still reliable choice. It has three files to 
implement and analyze the simulation which are Petri net Definition Files (PDF) which 
contains the static information, Transition Definition Files (TDF) and Main Simulation 
Files (MSF) which contains the dynamic details. 
The methodology of this simulation has two main steps: first, define the PDFs are 
considered as static definition phase as well. The elements include Places, Transitions 
and Arcs. After establishes the Petri net graph, TDFs are used to describe the transfer or 
fire condition. The most important step is definite the dynamics variables which include 
the initial tokens in places and the firing times during transitions.  
4.2 Simple Hash-Lock protocol model 
The protocol of Hash-Lock in single tag and Reader system is illustrated in Figure 
4-1. Reader sends Query to tag is the step that ‘pSR’ send token to ‘tRT’. When ‘pRRQ’ 
receives token, it means the tag has got the Query from Reader. Then the metaID will be 
sent from ‘pSRS’ to Reader by firing ‘tTRID’. 
Reader receives the metaID at place ‘pRRID’, and then transfers it to back-end 
database through ‘tRDB’. The transition ‘tDBR’ is fired to send key to Reader after the 
database searches the Hash table. Reader will transfer the key to tag, when‘tRK’ fires. 
Meanwhile the Reader has to wait for 15ms before sends <GetResult> request which is 
controlled by ‘tTS’. When ‘tHK’ fires, it means the tag is hashing the key and buffering 
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the result. Then ‘tCon’ is fired if each ‘pB2’ and ‘pB3’ has one token, which means tag 
will return the result to Reader after tag stores the result and gets the <GetResult> 
request. 
tCH
tDBR
tRDB
tTS
tRK
tRT
tTRID
tHK tCon
tMID
pDBR
pRDB
pGC
pRK
pSR
pRRID
pRCon
pB2
pB1
pRRQ
pRSR
pB3
ReaderDatabase Tag   
Figure 4-1 Model of Hash-Lock authentication protocol 
4.3 Multi-tag content access control protocol model 
According to the multi-tag content access control protocol using Hash-Lock 
presented before, the model of this protocol is shown in Figure 4-2. 
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Figure 4-2 Proposed protocol model 
4.4 Modules analysis  
4.4.1 Tag active control module 
pQ1 pFM1
tQ3
pNTpQ2
tQ1
 
Figure 4-3 Tag active control module 
    Figure 4-3 shows the process that Reader sends Query first, and then the tag is 
active when gets the Query. Reader at place ‘pQ1’ sends Query to tags by firing the 
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‘tQ1’. If there is a tag at place ‘pQ2’, the broadcasted data from Reader will be received 
by this tag. The number of tokens in ‘pNT’ means the number of tags who received the 
Query and ready for the next operation. The requirement to fire ‘tQ3’ is the number of 
tokens in ‘pQ2’ is one and at least one in ‘pNT’. This is shown in Figure 4-4. 
 
Figure 4-4 TDF of fire ‘tQ3’ 
4.4.2 Anti-collision module 
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Figure 4-5 Anti-collision module 
Figure 4-5 shows the module of anti-collision algorithm using monitor mechanism. 
It refers to the tag’s internal design. ‘pFM1’ represents the tag is ready to send data. The 
monitor function will turn on by firing ‘tFM1’ to transfer the token to ‘pFL1’. ‘tFL1’ 
represents tag listens to the channel for ∆t(ms), if the link is busy, tag will fire ‘tFL2’, 
otherwise tag will send signal by the means of fire ‘tFL3’. And the collision detection 
during the transmission is active, i.e. ‘tFM2’ is fired. If there is no conflict, ‘tFT2’ is 
fired which means the Reader can receive the signal correctly. And if collision is 
detected, then ‘tFT3’ is fired which means the signal will be sent again when the 
channel is available.  
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4.4.3 Channel control module of Reader 
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Figure 4-6 Authentication and channel control module 
This channel control module in Figure 4-6 refers to the design of Reader. When 
Reader receives the metaID from tag, ‘tM1’ is fired which means Reader will store the 
metaID and assign the priority R value. (metaID|R) will be sent to database through 
‘pM1’ which is connected with the database. Meanwhile Reader will reply (metaID|R) 
to tag by firing ‘tM3’. Reader receives (metaID|key|R) from database which is 
represented by ‘pM3’ receives a token. ‘tM6’ is fired if and only if place ‘pI1’, ‘pI2’ and 
‘pM3’ has a token each. There are two directions after ‘tM6’ fired. One direction is to 
fire transition ‘tM7’ sending (R|key) to tag and ‘pM9’ receives one token which works 
as a control token. After receives (R|key), tag will hash the key, and then stores the result 
in buffer with one token assigned to ‘pM11’. The other direction is the waiting and 
getting result implementation. After ‘pM12’ gets the token, ‘tM9’ is fired and 15ms later 
‘pM13’ receives one token. ‘tM10’ can be fired if and only if ‘pM13’, ‘pM9’ and ‘pI1’ 
has one token each, which means Reader can send (R|GetResult) to tag when Reader 
has sent (R|key) more than 15ms and the channel is available at that moment. After that, 
‘pM14’ gets one token. When tag has the result of authentication, ‘pM11’ has a token as 
the same as ‘pM14’, ‘tM11’ is fired to reply the result from tag to Reader. 
Notice that this module considers about the character of Reader’s communication 
channel which is serial. Thus, ‘pI1’ is the symbol of Reader’s channel. When Reader is 
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sending a signal, ‘pI1’ has no token, and ‘pI1’ has one token if the channel is available. 
And the sequence of sending the data is controlled by ‘pI2’ and ‘pM9’. 
As mentioned in the former chapters, this proposed protocol uses stack technology 
which obeys FIFO principle. It increases the rate of identification and provides a 
well-organized communication mode between Reader and tags. For example, if there 
are i tags that marked {t1, t2, ……, ti} with metaID {m1, m2, ……, mi} in the system. 
These tags share the priority values {R1, R2, ……, Ri} respectively. Assume that ‘pI1’ 
always fires ‘tM3’ when the three transitions ‘tM3’, ‘tM6’and ‘tM10’ are ready to fire, 
which means ‘tM3’ is prior to fire compared to ‘tM6’ and ‘tM10’. The result is that 
there are huge numbers of tokens stored in place ‘pI2’ and ‘pM3’. But in terms of using 
priority identification mechanism, all the tokens in the stack are sorted and matched, i.e. 
the top token has the minimum Ri. Only after the tag received its own priority Ri, the 
communication can use R as the index, and the place ‘pI2’ controls this sequence. ‘pM9’ 
can make sure that the Reader has kept waiting for at least 15ms after sent the data 
(R|key) to tag, and allows Reader to send the get result command. 
It is clear to see that the stack technology in the Reader control module makes the 
communication orderly and efficient, but the cost is Reader needs have enough memory 
storage to handle some big system with a large number of tags.  
4.4.4 Respond result module 
tM11
pM15 tM12
tM13
pFF
 
Figure 4-7 Respond the authentication result module 
Colored token is used in this module as shown in Figure 4-7. If the result is failed, 
then tag will mark the token as color type ‘FAIL’, otherwise will mark the token as color 
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type ‘PAS’. The color of the token in place ‘pM15’ decides which one of ‘tM12’ and 
‘tM13’ can be fired. If the color is ‘PAS’, ‘tM12’ will be fired and tag will turn to 
monitor status and be ready to send signal. Figure 4-8 is the TDF of fire ‘tM12’. 
Otherwise, the transition ‘tM13’ is fired and the TDF of ‘tM13’ is shown in Figure 4-9. 
 
Figure 4-8 TDF of ‘tM12’ 
 
Figure 4-9 TDF of ‘tM13’ 
4.4.5 Communication module between Reader and back-end database 
tCH
tDBR
tRDB
pDBR
pRDB
 
Figure 4-10 Encapsulated database module 
    Since the communication channel between Reader and back-end database is a kind 
of secure link, thesis does not deep discuss about it. Thus, this part is encapsulated as a 
whole which is shown in Figure 4-10. It is the same module in simple Hash-Lock 
protocol and the proposed one. 
4.5 Coverability tree analysis 
Coverability tree[41] is an important tool to analyze the reliability, stability and 
reachability of the system model. All the reachable states can be determined from a 
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given initial status. 
In order to running the coverability tree analysis, one complete discrete simulation 
system should be built by defining the PDFs, TDFs and MSF. According to the model’s 
structure the initial status assume that ‘pQ1’, ‘pNT’ and ‘pI1’ has one token for each, 
and the other places has no token. The initial status is shown in Figure 4-11.   
 
Figure 4-11 Initial status of coverability tree 
    After running the coverability tree test, there are 5806 determined states from the 
initial status. Figure 4-12 to Figure 4-16 are five states from coverability tree.  
 
Figure 4-12 Coverability tree (state=5799) 
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Figure 4-13 Coverability tree (state=5806) 
In Figure 4-13, the “Parent state” means that state ‘5799’ is its father state which is 
shown in Figure 4-12. State ‘5806’ is reachable after fires ‘tFM3’. The ‘Inf’ indicates 
that the number of token is increasing. Type ‘D’ means this is a duplicate state that can 
be reached by other accesses and may have child state, while ‘T’ means a terminal status 
that has no child state. If the type of state is none that means it is a transitional state 
which has child state. 
 
Figure 4-14 Coverability tree (state=5792) 
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Figure 4-15 Coverability tree (state=5804) 
 
Figure 4-16 Coverability tree (state=5805) 
    From Figure 4-14 to Figure 4-16, we can conclude the partially coverability tree as 
Figure 4-17 shown. State ‘5792’ can be reached when state ‘5751’ fires ‘tFM3’. If state 
‘5792’ fires ‘tQ1’, state ‘5804’ is reachable, otherwise if state ‘5792’ fires ‘tFM3’, state 
‘5805’ is reached. The tokens moving from one state to another is clearly shown from 
these figures. 
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Figure 4-17 Partially coverability tree 
4.6 Parameters  
To have a fair comparison, the parameters used here are referred from the ISO/IEC 
18000 standard. We assume the date rate between tag and Reader is 40kbps. In the 
proposed protocol, SHA-1 is employed as the Hash-Lock algorithm with 160bits output.  
Main parameters are set as follow: 
(1)  The length of Query is 64bits. 
(2)  In single tag Hash-Lock algorithm, the tag replies metaID with a random period 
∆ε ∈ [150,320]μs. 
(3)  In the proposed anti-collision algorithm, the detection period is ∆t ∈ [1,10]μs. 
(4)  The time of looking up Hash table in database is ∆τ ∈ [1,4]ms. 
(5)  According to the Table 3-2, ∆δ ∈ [0.85,12.74]ms. In [39] and [40], the encrypt 
time of tag is about 3.5ms when using 8bit SHA-1 algorithm with 100kHz clock 
frequency. 
4.7 Results and analysis 
4.7.1 Simple Hash-Lock protocol with single tag 
When the length of key is 128bits, the result of simulation is shown in Figure 4-13. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4-18 Single tag Hash-Lock protocol (the length of key is 128 bits) 
    In order to simplify the analysis, we modify the simulation curves of Figure (4-18.a) 
to Figure (4-18.b). At time t=0s, Reader sends Query to tag which cost time t1: t1 = 64bits 40kbps� = 1.6ms                       (4.1) 
After the tag receives the Query, it replies metaID during ∆ε ∈ �150，320�μs. Reader 
receives after time t2: t2 = 160bits 40kbps� = 4ms                       (4.2) 
Reader transfers the metaID to database, and receives the key as reply from database at 
around 7.6ms. Reader will send the key to the tag which take time t3, and wait for 15ms 
to get result.  t3 = 128bits 40kbps� = 3.2ms                     (4.3) 
At about 11ms, the tag receives the key, and starts to hash the key. At time 25.4ms, tag 
receives the get result require from Reader, and then replies the result. Finally, this 
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communication stops at 27.2ms.    
 
Figure 4-19 Single tag Hash-Lock protocol  
(with the length of key: 8bits and 512bits) 
From the figures in Figure 4-19, the authentication procedure that using 8bits 
length key costs 26.4ms while using 512bits length key costs 37.4ms. 
4.7.2 System efficiency of multi-tag content access control protocol 
 
Figure 4-20 Content access control protocol with one tag, complete time: 29.137ms 
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Figure 4-21 Content access control protocol with two tags, complete time: 48.537ms 
 
Figure 4-22 Content access control protocol with five tags, complete time: 89.161ms 
In these Figures, ‘pFT3’ stands for the numbers of correct signals received from 
tags. ‘pFRT3’ represents the number of tags which Reader can access, while ‘pFF’ refers 
to the number of tags which Reader cannot access.  
As mentioned in Figure 4-20, one tag authentication using our proposed protocol 
costs almost the same time as the single tag Hash-Lock protocol. If there are two tags, 
our proposed method takes 48.5ms which is 6ms less than the time that original 
Hash-Lock running twice. The new protocol saves about 11% time. If the number of 
tags increases to five, our new approach costs only about 90ms which is 45ms less than 
the old protocol costs. 
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Figure 4-23 Simulation of proposed protocol with 10,20,50 tags 
    Figure 4-23 shows that authentication time for 10, 20 and 50 tags is about 165ms, 
318ms and 770ms respectively. It is obvious that the efficiency is improved about 39%, 
41% and 43% respectively.   
 
Figure 4-24 Simulation of proposed protocol with 100 tags 
    When there are 100 tags in the RFID system, time needed to finish the 
identification is approximate 1528ms, as shown in Figure 4-24. Therefore the system 
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efficiency is improved about 43% compared with the old approach. 
 
Figure 4-25 Improved efficiency by proposed protocol 
As shown in Figure 4-25, in a small size system (e.g. less than 20 tags) when the 
number of tags is increasing, the efficiency is improved greatly. When there are about 
20 to 50 tags, the improved efficiency of the system will grow steady and it will hold 
flat at the maximum value about 43% if the number of tags is more than 50. 
4.7.3 Channel utilization rate of multi-tag content access control protocol 
 
Figure 4-26 Simulation result of 40% channel utilization 
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When the channel utilization rate is 40%, the simulation result of one tag, 5 tags 
and 20 tags is illustrated in Figure 4-26. Compared to original protocol, the system 
efficiency is improved 0%, 36% and 43% respectively, with the implementation period 
about 28.5ms, 86ms and 310ms. The result is almost the same as the figures shown in 
Figure 4-25 whose channel utilization is 10%. 
 
Figure 4-27 Simulation result of 60% channel utilization 
When the channel utilization rate is 60%, the cost to implement the authentication 
with 5 or 20 tags is about 93ms or 310ms respectively illustrated in the Figure 4-27. 
Compared to the original protocol, the efficiency is improved as 31% or 43%.  
According to the results, with different channel utilizations, such as 10%, 40% and 
60%, the improved efficiency curve is almost the same. Thus, it can be concluded that 
the proposed protocol can improve the efficiency greatly and can hold high channel 
utilization. 
Furthermore, the proposed protocol combines both anti-collision and security 
authentication mechanisms, while the original protocol just consider about the 
authentication part. If add the anti-collision module into the original, the cost of time 
will be more. 
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4.8 Summary 
    This chapter focuses on the modeling and simulation of the proposed protocol. 
First establish the protocol model, then analysis the modules. The simulation results 
demonstrate that the new system using proposed protocol has better efficiency and 
higher channel utilization rate.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusion and Further Developments  
5.1 Conclusion 
Compared with other traditional identification technologies, RFID has huge 
application potential according to its characters. But under different application contexts, 
there is a need to develop one protocol which can combine security protocol with 
anti-collision algorithm. 
This thesis proposed a multi-tag content access protocol using Hash-Lock 
mechanism and ALOHA based anti-collision algorithm. Several approaches are 
introduced into this protocol. For RFID Reader, one priority register is designed to rank 
the order of multiple tags. Channel control mechanism is applied to control the serial 
transmission of Reader. For RFID tag, a monitor mechanism is used to increase the 
system efficiency. The advantages and disadvantages of the proposed protocol are 
discussed. Simulation results indicate that the new protocol performs well when applied 
to RFID tag content access control together with the anti-collision, in this way multiple 
tags can be identified in batch.  
5.2 Further developments 
The research on RFID security is developing rapidly. According to the idea of this 
thesis, Tree-based anti-collision combine with ECC encryption algorithm might be 
discussed and developed in future.  
In terms of this proposed protocol, some applications can be designed and 
implemented in daily life. One open application research based on this protocol is the 
subway check out system.  
In many cities, the payment of subway tickets is according to the miles or the 
number of stations. And the simple model is like this: reader will check the travel card 
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and make a record when people enter the subway and check out and charges the money 
when people exit. Most of the exit ports require the customers identified one by one 
which cost lots of time when there is large number of customers.  
As mentioned before, the proposed protocol supports identify of multi-tag in batch. 
Thus, one scenario might be designed as follow. When customers enter the subway, 
reader will check the smart travel card check and record the entrance information. At the 
exit port, a check-out table should be set which is a kind of Reader that can deal with 
multi-tag content access control protocol. The Reader identifies the cards, ends the 
entrance record, charges and displays the verified information. If the card asks for a dual 
entrance without an end record of last entrance, Reader will charge for the last trip with 
the maximum fee and then make a new entrance record. All the information will be 
displayed on a connected screen. Of course, the personal information is protected using 
another distinguished id to the privacy ID. The proposed application structures can be 
specified in the Figure 5-1.   
ReaderCARD Database
(2)Entrance require 
Pass.
Record the entrance
(3)Check info.
Normal Exception
(4)Result
(5)Operation 
End the entrance record
Record new entrance
 Charges and refresh the balance 
Display the balance
Pass.
Refresh the balance
Record the new entrance
Failed 
Authentication 
Display Error
Display on an external screen 
(1)Query
Dual entrance 
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Others
 
(a) Identification of subway ticket system (Entrance) 
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(b) Identification of subway ticket system (Check-out) 
Figure 5-1 Subway ticket system using multi-tag content access control 
The proposed application in subway system is feasible though more factors need to 
be considered in real system. Just like the RFID technology, the cost and efficiency 
should trade off at some certain balance point.  
It is far away from enough to develop a perfect protocol to deal with complex 
applications during the short period. For instance, the power consumption, the system’s 
bit error rate and the implementation on hardware are the following research directions.  
There might be some mistakes or thoughtless of the thesis, it should be grateful to 
be modified in future.  
。
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